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Refusals to Answer at  Oral Deposition: 
A "Relevant" Inquiry? 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were designed "to se- 
cure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every 
action,"' with a minimum of judicial intervention in the discov- 
ery process. Nevertheless, many participants have found the vi- 
sion of unsupervised yet efficient discovery to be a fleeting mirage 
in oral depositions. Much of this problem is caused by attorneys, 
who often instruct deponents not to answer questions the lawyers 
consider irrelevant to the l a ~ s u i t . ~  This Comment outlines the 
Federal Rules and corresponding judicial interpretations that 
govern the taking of depositions, with particular attention on 
refusals to answer based on irrelevance, bad faith questioning, 
and privilege. The Comment then discusses the proper procedure 
to be followed in each instance, and concludes with an admoni- 
tion that lawyers and judges strictly comply with the Rules in 
promoting the efficient use of oral depositions in discovery. 
A. The Standard for Relevance 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not clearly indicate 
whether an attorney may without sanction instruct a deponent 
not to answer questions deemed irrelevant by the attorney. Rule 
26(b) defines discoverable information in general: 
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privi- 
leged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the 
pending action . . . . It is not ground for objection that the 
information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the infor- 
mation sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the dis- 
covery of admissible e~idence.~ 
Allowing discovery of "relevant" information sets up a standard 
similar to that used in trial for evidentiary  purpose^,^ although 
1. FED. R. CIV. P. 1. See C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 84, 
at 420 (3d ed. 1976). 
2. See Ralston Purina Co. v. McFarland, 550 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1977). According to 
the court, "[C]ounsel for Purina effectively stopped the examination" by repeatedly 
objecting to questions asked and instructing the witness not to answer. Id. at 972 & n.lO. 
3, FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(l). There are special provisions in Rule 26(b) regarding 
insurance agreements and trial preparations. They are, however, beyond the scope of this 
Comment. 
4. See FED. R. EVID. 401. 
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the last sentence in Rule 26(b)(l) appears specifically to disclaim 
that standard. What is seemingly a contradiction is actually the 
imposition of two standards, one for discovery and another for 
trial. The difference between the two is only a matter of degree. 
The Advisory Committee on Proposed Amendments to the Fed- 
eral Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discovery explained: 
"Since decisions as to relevance to the subject matter of the ac- 
tion are made for discovery purposes well in advance of trial, a 
flexible treatment of relevance is required and the making of 
discovery . . . is not a concession or determination of relevance 
for purposes of trial."5 
The flexible treatment accorded evidence in discovery is well 
illustrated by the mandate in Rule 30 that "[e]vidence objected 
to shall be taken subject to the ~bjections."~ It is not clear, how- 
ever, to whom the mandate is directed. Because Rule 30(c) speci- 
fies the manner for the recording of depositions, the mandate may 
be intended to direct the officer present to record all evidence 
given despite a formal objection. On the other hand, it may be 
interpreted to direct the witness to answer all questions, even 
though a formal objection is made. The courts have recognized 
the latter interpretation. 
B. Protective Orders 
If either a party or a deponent anticipates that a deposition 
may involve the party or deponent in "annoyance, embarrass- 
ment, oppression, or undue burden or expense," he may, under 
Rule 26(c), move to limit the scope of discovery.' Upon this mo- 
tion, the court may issue a protective order limiting the matters 
subject to inquiry in the forthcoming depositi~n.~ If a party or 
deponent encounters similar annoyance or bad faith once the 
deposition has begun, he may, pursuant to Rule 30(d), move to 
limit or terminate the depo~ition.~ 
Both Rule 30(d) and Rule 26(c) incorporate Rule 37(a)(4), 
-- - 
5 .  Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to Discov- 
ery, Advisory Committee's Explanatory Statement Concerning Amendments of the Dis- 
covery Rules, 48 F.R.D. 487, 498 (1970) (citation omitted) [hereinafter cited as Advisory 
Committee Statement]. 
6. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c). 
7. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c). 
8. Id. 
9. FED. R. CN. P. 30(d). As in a Rule 26(c) motion, to prevail the moving party must 
show "that the examination is being conducted in bad faith or in such a manner as 
unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party." Id. 
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which provides that a party seeking a protective order may be 
required to pay the expenses, including attorneys' fees, of the 
opposing party unless the motion was substantially justified. On 
the other hand, the party whose actions necessitated the motion 
must pay the expenses of the moving party unless his conduct was 
substantially justified.1° A strict reading of the Rule forces the 
party contemplating the protective order to balance his need for 
the order against the possibility that he may be required to pay 
for the other party's opposition to the motion. 
C.  Motion to Compel Answers 
If a deponent refuses to answer a question, either on his own 
initiative or upon instruction from counsel, the party seeking dis- 
covery may move under Rule 37(a)(2) for an order compelling an 
answer. If the motion is denied, the court may issue a protective 
order. 
Not only may a deponent be ordered to answer certain ques- 
tions, he may also be required to pay the expenses of the motion, 
including attorneys' feed2 On the other hand, if the moving party 
loses, he may be required to pay the expenses of opposing the 
motion.13 Like a motion for a protective order, Rule 37(a)(4) pro- 
vides that the court shall award expenses for the motion to com- 
pel answers or opposition thereto "unless the court finds that the 
opposition to [or making of] the motion was substantially justi- 
fied or that other circumstances make an award of expenses un- 
just."14 
Although the rules have long provided for the awarding of 
expenses, awards have been relatively rare.15 The Advisory Com- 
mittee for the 1970 changes in the discovery rules expressed hope 
that the changes would remedy the judicial reluctance to award 
expenses, stating that "expenses should ordinarily be awarded 
unless a court finds that the losing party acted justifiably in 
carrying his point to ~ourt."~%lthough the Advisory Committee 
expressly stated that awards of expenses should deter further 
10. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(4). 
11. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(2). For a general discussion of the necessary procedure in 
seeking an order to compel discovery, see Note, The Emerging Deterrence Orientation in 
the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91 HAW. L. REV. 1033,1037-38 (1978) [hereinafter 
cited as Discovery Sanctions]. 
12. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(4). 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Advisory Committee Statement, supra note 5,  at 540. 
16. Id. 
410 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I979 
abuses,17 one commentator has noted judicial lenity in the appli- 
cation of discovery sanctions. l8 There is, however, an increasing 
tendency to recognize the need for deterring future discovery 
abuses, and an emerging emphasis on Rule 37(a)(4) as the means 
of accomplishing that end? 
Generally, attorneys have advanced three justifications for 
instructing deponents not to answer questions propounded at  oral 
depositions: irrelevance, bad faith, and privilege. 
A. Irrelevance 
Questions eliciting irrelevant testimony have been more lib- 
erally allowed in depositions than at trial.20 At trial, irrelevant 
evidence is inadrnis~ible.~~ By contrast, irrelevance is not gener- 
ally a proper basis for refusing to answer questions propounded 
at oral  deposition^.^^ 
A leading, recent case in support of the proposition that 
counsel may not properly instruct a deponent not to answer a 
question on grounds of irrelevance is Ralston Purina Co. v.  
McFarland. 23 The case involved the alleged breach of several con- 
tracts for delivery of soybeans. On deposition of the principal 
witness for the Ralston Purina Co., McFarland's attorney sought 
information that would establish a pattern of performance in the 
contracts. Counsel for Ralston Purina permitted the witness to 
answer partially one question, and then "effectively stopped the 
examination" by continually objecting to the questions asked and 
instructing the witness not to answer." The trial court denied 
McFarland's motion to compel answers under Rule 37(a). Vaca- 
ting that decision, the Fourth Circuit declared: 
Since we cannot guess what answers might have been elicited 
from Mr. Wagnon but for counsel's thwarting of the purpose of 
17. Id. 
18. See Discovery Sanctions, supra note 11, at 1033-34. 
19. Id. 
20. "Basically the propriety of probing any matter within the knowledge of [a] 
deponent is dependent upon relevancy-and relevancy, especially at the pre-trial stage, 
is very liberally construed." Banco Nacional de Credito Ejidal v. Bank of America Nat'l 
Trust and Sav. Ass'n, 11 F.R.D. 497, 499 (N.D. Cal. 1951). 
21. FED. R. E m .  402. 
22. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(l). 
23. 550 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1977). 
24. Id. at 972 & n.lO. 
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the deposition, we must assume that his answers would have 
been beneficial and, if not themselves constituting relevant evi- 
dence, might have led to the procuring of such evidence. 
The action of plaintiff's counsel in directing Wagnon not to 
answer the questions posed to him was indefensible and utterly 
a t  variance with the discovery provisions of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. . . . The questions put to Wagnon were ger- 
mane to the subject matter of the pending a c t i ~ n  and therefore 
properly within the scope of discovery. They should have been 
answered and, in any event, the action of plaintiff's counsel in 
directing the deponent not to answer was highly improper. The 
Rule itself says "Evidence objected to shall be taken subject to 
the objections . . . ." If plaintiff's counsel had any objection to 
the questions, under Rule 30(c) he should have placed it on the 
record and the evidence would have been taken subject to such 
objection. If counsel felt that the discovery procedures were 
being conducted in bad faith or abused in any manner, the 
appropriate action was to present the matter to the court by 
motion under Rule 3O(d) .25 
In another leading case, Shapiro v. Freern~n,~' a small girl 
allegedly suffered permanent psychiatric shock when a private 
airplane crashed into the home of her parents. While deposing the 
plaintiff's school teachers, defendants sought information regard- 
ing her psychological adjustment to school. The plaintiff's attor- 
ney objected to nearly all of the questions and instructed the 
witness not to answer. Ruling on a motion to compel answers to 
the questions, the court found the conduct of the plaintiff's attor- 
ney to be wholly improper. Noting the Rule 30(c) mandate that 
"[elvidence objected to shall be taken subject to the objections," 
the court cautioned: "It is not the prerogative of counsel, but of 
the court, to rule on objections. Indeed, if counsel were to rule on 
the propriety of questions, oral examinations would be quickly 
reduced to an exasperating cycle of answerless inquiries and court 
orders."27 The court then held that "[counsel] had no right what- 
ever to impose silence or to instruct the witnesses not to an- 
s ~ e r . " ~ ~  The crucial consideration is not that discovery of irrele- 
25. Id. a t  973-74 (footnote omitted). See also Drew v. International Bhd. of Sulphite 
& Paper Mill Workers, 37 F.R.D. 446, 450 (D.D.C. 1965) (although objection on ground 
of relevancy is proper, instruction not to answer is improper). 
26. 38 F.R.D. 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
27. Id. at  311. 
28. Id. a t  312. The court went on to express its displeasure with what i t  obviously 
viewed as abuse of discovery: 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were designed as an affirmative aid 
to substantive justice, and those who choose to read them restrictively do so a t  
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vant testimony impedes the judicial process, but rather that 
" [tlhe harm caused by being required to take additional deposi- 
tions of a witness who fails to answer a question based on an 
improperly asserted objection far exceeds the mere inconvenience 
of a witness having to answer a question which may not be admis- 
sible at the trial of the action."29 
B. The "Bad Faith" Exception 
Although the Federal Rules provide that "[elvidence ob- 
jected to shall be taken subject to the objections," the Rules and 
the judicial interpretations recognize an important exception. An 
instruction not to answer may be justified in response to ques- 
tions asked in bad faith or with intent to annoy, embarrass, or 
oppress the deponent or other party. 
An argument may be made that despite the liberal construc- 
tion of "relevancy" for discovery purposes, questions 
"unquestionably beyond the scope of the issues of the lawsuit" 
should not be answered.30 These questions may be viewed as noth- 
ing more than one example of conducting the examination "in 
such manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the 
deponent or party."31 At least one court has indicated that an 
instruction not to answer is proper in the bad faith context.32 
However, another court has held that, when confronted with bad 
faith questioning, it is not proper for counsel to instruct the depo- 
nent not to answer. Rather, counsel should stop the deposition 
and apply for a protective order pursuant to Rule 30(d), which is 
designed to prevent examinations "conducted in bad faith."% 
their peril. It is time that depositions be conducted by members of the bar in a 
cooperative manner, in accordance with both the letter and spirit of the rules, 
without petty bickering and without intervention by busy courts with more 
important matters pressing for attention. It is clear to us that plaintiffs' attorney 
has no conception of his obligation to observe the rules "as an officer of the 
court" or otherwise. Rather, he appears to be bent on concealing vital facts or, 
at best, waging a war of delay, expense, harassment and frustration. There is 
no justification for his conduct, no basis at all for his instructing the deponents 
not to answer. As a result, the cooperative atmosphere envisaged by the federal 
rules has been poisoned by antagonism. Id. 
29. W.R. Grace & Co. v. Pullman, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 80,84 (W.D. Okla. 1977). The court 
also noted, "This seems to be the very purpose of the provisions of Rule 30(c) . . . ." Id. 
30. Amco Eng'r Co. v. Bud Radio, Inc., 38 F.R.D. 51, 53 (N.D. Ohio 1965). 
31. FED. R. Crv. P. 301d). 
32. See Amco Eng'r Co. v. Bud Radio, Inc., 38 F.R.D. 51, 53 (N.D. Ohio 1965). 
33. See Shapiro v. Freeman, 38 F.R.D. 308,311-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Interestingly, the 
Shapiro court noted in dictum that the same procedure should be followed in response to 
questions seeking to elicit privileged information. Id. 
Actually, a combination of both approaches will best produce 
the result contemplated by the Federal Rules. If a party or depo- 
nent feels that the questioning does demonstrate the requisite 
bad faith, refusing to answer the questions is simply a convenient 
means of halting the deposition and applying to the court for a 
protective order. The party seeking discovery may utilize the hia- 
tus to move to compel an answer. Thus, where the question is 
asked to annoy, embanass, or oppress, a deponent arguably may 
refuse to answer, especially if he subsequently applies for a pro- 
tective order. 
C. Privilege 
Deponents may often be instructed not to answer because the 
information sought is privileged. The privilege protection was 
explicitly extended to depositions in the 1972 amendment to Rule 
30(c), which expressly incorporated the Federal Rules of Evi- 
d e n ~ e . ~ ~  Explaining that change, the notes of the Advisory Com- 
mittee on the Rules observe that "many pertinent topics included 
in the Rules of Evidence are not mentioned in Rule 43(b), e.g. 
privilege .''35 
Although the Advisory Committee notes indicate that the 
discovery rules should include the evidentiary protections given 
privileged testimony at trial, there is no language in the Federal 
Rules expressly authorizing a deponent to refuse to answer a 
question on the basis of privilege. Indeed, such a refusal would 
apparently contravene the effect of the Rule 30(c) mandate that 
"[elvidence objected to shall be taken subject to the objec- 
tions."" Several judicial determinations, however, have focused 
on a different approach to questions involving privilege. 
In Preyer v.  United States Lines, I ~ C . , ~ '  the court in dicta 
specified a different treatment for questions eliciting privileged 
testimony than for those potentially discovering irrelevant infor- 
mation. Relying on Rule 30(c), the court explained: "When the 
objection involves a claim of privilege, a strict application of this 
34. Prior to its 1972 amendment, Rule 30(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
began: "Examination and cross-examination of witnesses may proceed as permitted at the 
trial under the provisions of Rule 43(b)." FED: R. CIV. P. 30(c), 48 F.R.D. 459, 466 (1970). 
The amended Rule reads: "Examination and cross-examination of witnesses may proceed 
as permitted at the trial under the provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence." FED. R. 
CIV. P. 30(c). 
35. 28 U.S.C. app. Rule 30(c) note (1976) (Advisory Committee-1972 Amendment). 
36. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(c). 
37. 64 F.R.D. 430 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 546 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1976). 
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rule would undermine the values thereby pr~tected."~' The court 
found, however, that the controverted questions involved "no real 
claim of privilege" and held that "[wlhere, as here, the objection 
is merely based on assertions of irrelevance, the rule should be 
strictly applied. 
Similarly, in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Pullman, I~c . ,~O the court 
explained that "disclosure would undermine the protections af- 
forded by the privilege" and that "the general rules as to the 
scope of discovery as set out heretofore excludes [sic] discovery 
of privileged matter."41 
Because privileged matter has been judicially exempted from 
the provisions of Rule 30(c), courts have approved refusals to 
answer questions seeking privileged information. In Perrignon v. 
Bergen Brunswig C~rp . , ' ~  the court stated that the party seeking 
to prevent disclosure of a privileged communication could have 
either sought a Rule 26(c) protective order prior to the deposition, 
or terminated the existing deposition and sought a protective 
order pursuant to Rule 30(d).43 Since the party seeking to prevent 
the disclosure had not applied for either type of protective order, 
the court suggested that "[alt the very least, [counsel] should 
have advised [the deponent] not to answer the  question^."^^ 
Perrignon is not a new application of the discovery rules to 
privileged testimony. More than twenty-five years ago, the plain- 
tiff in a libel action moved to limit the scope of a deposition, 
asserting that many of the questions asked infringed upon her 
constitutional immunity as a United States Senator. The court 
ruled that one may properly refuse to answer questions seeking 
privileged information: 
As a matter of general principle, it is most difficult for the 
court to rule on the question of privilege in the abstract. The 
normal procedure, and, the court feels, the proper one to be 
followed in this case, is for the examination to proceed, the 
plaintiff to refuse to answer those questions for which refusals 
38. Id. at 431. 
39. Id. 
40. 74 F.R.D. 80 (W.D. Okla. 1977). 
41. Id. at 85. 
42. 77 F.R.D. 455 (N.D. Cal. 1978). 
43. Id. at 460-61. 
44. Id. at 461. Although the party objected to the questions asked, the court found 
that it had failed to take "reasonable and available steps to prevent disclosure, [which] 
constituted a voluntary consent to disclosure of part of the privileged communication." 
Id. at 460. The court emphasized, however, that there is no per se rule that a party waives 
a privilege by failing to seek a protective order. Id. at 461. 
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she asserts privilege, and then for the matter to be submitted 
to a court for ruling on the specific questions disputed.45 
The distinction between treatment of irrelevant testimony 
and privileged information is sound. The general function of priv- 
ilege is to prevent disclosure of certain protected communications 
and thereby promote complete candor in certain necessary or 
intimate communications.4s Once disclosure occurs, the policy 
behind the privilege is thwarted. Special protections at the depo- 
sition stage are necessary to the maintenance of the privilege. On 
the other hand, the policy behind the relevance standard exists 
primarily to encourage economy in the trial process and to avoid 
confusing the trier of fact. Although the discovery of irrelevant 
testimony may result in some wasted time during the deposition 
for both parties, simply answering the questions is more efficient 
than seeking or defending a Rule 37(a) motion to compel answers. 
Moreover, there is little danger of confusing the trier of fact by 
the presentation of irrelevant testimony because the trier of fact 
is not present at the deposition. In other words, the policy under- 
lying a relevance standard is adequately safeguarded by the inad- 
missibility of irrelevant evidence at trial, without the need to 
enforce the standard during the taking of depositions. 
A. Noting Objections 
The proper procedure for noting objections to questions 
asked at  oral deposition was outlined more than twenty-five years 
ago in Bunco Nacional de Credito Ejidal v. Bank of America 
National Trust & Savings Ass~c ia t ion .~~  After pointing out that 
the discovery rules contemplate a liberal construction of 
"relevancy," the court dictated the procedure for recording objec- 
tions: 
If deponent objects to the questions asked, the proper procedure 
is for him to answer and note his objections in the deposi- 
tion. . . . At any time during the taking of the deposition the 
deponent or any party, upon a showing that the examination is 
being conducted in bad faith or in such a manner as unreasona- 
bly to annoy, embarrass or oppress, may move the court to 
terminate or limit the examination. Rule 30(d). These safe- 
45. Smith v. Crown Publishers, Inc., 14 F.R.D. 514, 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). 
46. See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (rev. 1961). 
47. 11 F.R.D. 497 (N.D. Cal. 1951). 
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guards, the first of logic, the others of procedure should suffice 
to protect a party who is objecting in good faith.48 
The procedure outlined in Bunco Nacionul has consistently 
been recognized as the proper way to object to deposition ques- 
tions.*' As explained by Professor Wright, "If there is objection 
to a question, the reporter will simply note the objection in the 
transcript and the witness will answer the question despite the 
obje~t ion."~~ 
The requirement that a deponent answer questions despite 
objection stems from the sound policy favoring judicial economy. 
As explained by one court, "This approach conserves the parties 
or witnesses' time and money, as well as judicial resources, and 
expedites the trial of the law~uit."~' Moreover, by simply recog- 
nizing that objections on relevancy or other grounds will be pre- 
served in the record for consideration at trial, counsel can obviate 
the need for repeated depositions of the same witness or time- 
consuming and expensive rulings by the court on matters that can 
easily be resolved at trial. 
Strict adherence to the Federal Rules thereby eliminates the 
use of refusals to answer questions as a dilatory tactic during 
discovery, while providing adequate protection against the preju- 
dicial impact of inadmissible evidence at trial. This protection is 
complemented by the economic protections provided in Rule 
37(a). 
B. Award of Costs and Fees 
In addition to motions to compel answers, the Federal Rules 
and corresponding judicial interpretations provide a collateral 
enforcement mechanism. Rule 37(a)(4) provides that upon the 
granting of a motion to compel an answer, "the party or deponent 
48. Id. a t  499 (citation omitted). 
49. See, e.g., Ralston Purina Co. v. McFarland, 550 F.2d 967 (4th Cir. 1977); W.R. 
Grace & Co. v. Pullman, Inc., 74 F.R.D. 80 (W.D. Okla. 1977); Preyer v. United States 
Lines, Inc., 64 F.R.D. 430 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 546 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1976); Shapiro v. 
Freeman, 38 F.R.D. 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); Drew v. International Bhd. of Sulphite & Paper 
Mill Workers, 37 F.R.D. 446 (D.D.C. 1965). 
50. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK F THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 8 84, at  420 (3d ed. 1976) 
(footnote omitted). Professor Wright comments that this procedure is an "important 
exception" to the general rule that a t  depositions the examination and cross-examination 
proceeds "in the same fashion as at a trial." Id. See also Lloyd v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 74 
F.R.D. 518, 520 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) (quoting Professor Wright); Dellefield v. Blockdel 
Realty Co., 40 F. Supp. 212, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1941). 
51. Drew v. International Bhd. of Sulphite & Paper Mill Workers, 37 F.R.D. 446,449 
(D.D.C. 1965). 
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whose conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney 
advising such conduct or both of them" may be required to pay 
the costs of bringing the motion, including attorneys' fees, unless 
there is substantial justification for the c ~ n d u c t . ~ ~  Thus, one 
whose conduct "impose[s] unnecessary and unreasonable ex- 
pense upon the adverse party and . . . delay[s] the proceedings" 
must pay those expenses.53 
Adequate protection is given the deponent who refuses to 
answer the question in the good faith belief that the question 
seeks privileged information or is asked in bad faith. Expenses are 
not awarded if the party or deponent's opposition to or filing of a 
motion to compel an answer is "substantially justified" or the 
court finds "that other circumstances make an award of expenses 
unjust."54 If, however, the filing of or opposition to the motion is 
without substantial jus t i f icat i~n,~~ the Rule provides that the 
court shall award costs of the motion.56 One court held that this 
"rule imposes a mandatory duty upon the Court to impose the 
sanctions therein pr~vided."~' On the other hand, at least one 
court has viewed these sanctions as discretionary. That court 
ordered each party to bear its own costs of the motion, despite a 
finding that one party acted without substantial ju~tification.~~ 
The better interpretation of the Rule is the former-expenses 
should always be awarded absent a showing of substantial justifi- 
cation. This interpretation advances the emerging trend to utilize 
Rule 37 sanctions as a deterrent to discovery abuses,5g and recog- 
nizes the ineffectiveness of withholding sanctions in the hope that 
the parties will comply with the discovery rules in the future.6u In 
either event, however, the award of expenses is occasioned only 
in response to a motion to compel answers or a protective order 
under Rules 26(c) or 30(d), both of which incorporate the costs 
and fees provisions of Rule 37(a)(4) Regardless of whether costs 
52. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(4). 
53. Braziller v. Lind, 32 F.R.D. 367, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). 
54. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(4). See also Braziller v. Lind, 32 F.R.D. 367,368 (S.D.N.Y. 
1963). 
55. The courts have applied the substantial justification standard on a case-by-case 
basis without attempting to define the term. 
56. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(4). 
57. Palma v. Luke Waukomis Dev. Co., 48 F.R.D. 366, 369 (W.D. Mo. 1970). 
58. Drew v. International Bhd. of Sulphite & Paper Mill Workers, 37 F.R.D. 446,449- 
50 (D.D.C. 1965). 
59. See Discovery Sanctions, supra note 11, a t  1044-54. 
60. Id. a t  1040-41. 
61. Cf. Gibbs v. Blackwelder, 346 F.2d 943,947 (4th Cir. 1965) (expenses not awarded 
where no order was sought, focusing on the remedial rather than the deterrent effect of 
the sanctions). 
418 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I979 
and fees awards are imposed as a remedy or a deterrent, their 
effectiveness is enhanced by the judge's discretion to impose 
them upon the party at fault, whether that be the deponent, the 
party himself, or one or more of the attorneys involved. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The practice of instructing a deponent not to answer certain 
questions in a depositon needs no further proscription in the Fed- 
eral Rules. The Rules and decisions interpreting them provide 
adequate protections from abuses of the discovery process. If a 
question is asked in bad faith or with a purpose to "annoy, embar- 
rass, or oppress" the deponent or opposing party, the deponent 
may refuse to answer the question and apply for a protective 
order. Adequate protection is given against an award of costs and 
fees by the "substantial justification" provision of Rule 37(a)(4). 
Similar protections are afforded privileged information. This 
approach minimizes judicial interference. A sound reading of the 
Rules suggests that courts should be involved in the taking of 
depositions only to issue protective orders or compel answers.BZ 
The taking of oral depositions is designed to be a cooperative, 
self-regulating discovery The scope of the deposition is lim- 
ited only by the rules of privilege and the standards for the issu- 
ance of a protective order. Questions objected to on grounds of 
relevancy are not within these exceptions, and should be an- 
swered, subject to recording the objection in the transcript. Ex- 
press provision is made for the preservation of objections made 
during the deposition, and the resulting exclusion, if appropriate, 
of the question or answer at trial. Both the courts and the litiga- 
tors must become aware of and implement the procedures and 
sanctions provided by the Rules to insure efficient discovery of 
information with minimal use of dilatory tactics and judicial in- 
tervention. 
Kent E. Cammack 
62. Cf. Russo v. Merck & Co., 21 F.R.D. 237,240 (D.R.I. 1957) (court may not exercise 
its power to limit the deposition absent a "showing that the examination is being con- 
ducted in bad faith or in such manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress"). 
63. See Perrignon v. Bergen Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455, 460 n.4 (N.D. Cal. 1978) 
("Rule 30(d) is the only authority allowing the interruption of a deposition."). 
